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STRUCTURING MULTICLAIM LIDGATION:
SHOULD RULE 23 BE REVISED?
William W Schwarzer*

Class actions have become a prominent feature of the litigation
landscape. The class-action device is now employed in a wide variety of type~ of litigation, including consumer, securities, antitrust,
employment, civil rights, and institutional-reform litigation, and increasingly in mass-accident, product-liability, and toxic-tort litigation. But as class actions have become more prominent, they also
have come under increasing scrutiny because of their impact on
parties and others and because of the magnitude of the stakes. As
courts confront the difficult issues class actions raise, scholarly comment and criticism abound, and political controversy rages. All of
this has led to close examination of the fountainhead of class-action
jurisprudence, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
has raised the question whether it should be revised.
The question can be approached from diverse perspectives. For
example, those whose interests are in mass-tort litigation likely will
take an entirely different approach from others who are interested
in consumer litigation or civil rights litigation or securities litigation.
As Professor Edward Cooper has observed, the arguments for and
against amending Rule 23 rest on assumptions about how well it
works, or does not work, now. 1 But judgments about how well the
Rule works necessarily turn on one's expectations, and the expectations of those litigating in different fields differ greatly.
The question whether Rule 23 should be revised therefore is not
susceptible to a global answer unless revision is stylistic only, limited to making the text more elegant - and even stylistic revision is
likely to have some substantive impact, even if unintended. But if
the argument for revision is that the Rule is in some respect deficient and should be made to work better, one must begin by answering the question how it should work. That in tum depends on
defining the Rule's purpose - what it is intended to accomplish.
* Senior United States District Judge, Northern District of California; Director, Federal
Judicial Center, 1990-95. - Ed. Alexandra Petrich assisted in the preparation of this paper.
1. See Edward H. COoper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process 3 (Apr. 21-22,
1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with
the New York University School of Law).
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This paper examines briefly the purposes for which the Rule was
adopted in 1966 and the purposes to which it since has been put. It
then discusses how different purposes call for different class-action
regimes, that is, how the regulation of a class action must reflect the
objectives for which it is invoked. It concludes by considering how
these differences may be best accommodated: whether by revising
the Rule or by greater reliance on the existing structuring devices
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and improved practices
under the Rule.
!.

PURPOSES OF RULE

23

Before deciding whether to fix the Rule, one should determine
whether it is broken - is it working as it should? That, of course,
depends on what its purpose is - and that is a question not susceptible of a simple and inclusive answer.
The present Rule is the product of the revision adopted in 1966.
The purpose of that revision, as reflected in the Advisory Committee's note, was to clarify the availability of class actions in various
situations and simplify the Rule's application.2 Professor Benjamin
Kaplan, the Advisory Committee's reporter, wrote that the revision
of Rule 23 was prompted by "[d]espondency over the inadequacies
of [the] rule."3 According to Kaplan, "[t]he class action device ...
had become snarled," and the "essential task" of the Advisory
Committee "was to redefine the conditions for maintaining the fully
effective action. "4 The members of the Committee were of the
opinion that some litigation "affecting numerous persons 'naturally'
or 'necessarily' called for unitary adjudication."5 To this end, the
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (Proposed Amendments 1966) [hereinafter Advisory Committee's Note], reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 69, 98 (1966).
The categories of class actions in the original rule ...
. . . proved obscure and uncertain....
Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide to the proper extent of the judgments in
class actions....
[In addition,] the original rule did not squarely address itself to the question of the
measures that might be taken during the course of the action to assure procedural fairness, particularly giving notice to the members of the class ....
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining
class actions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in
judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class ... and
refers to the measures which can be taken to assure the fair conduct of these actions.
39 F.R.D. at 98-99.
3. Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HA.'1.v. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967).
4. Id. at 385-86.
5. Id. at 386.
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Committee attempted to "rebuild the law on functional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass litigation through representative parties."6
Professor Judith Resnik has characterized the Advisory Committee's motivation, as evidenced by unpublished correspondence
exchanged by the members of the Committee, as "permeated by
'pragmatism.' Memos and letters invoke the need or absence of
need for class actions in the context of specific cases. " 7 Of these,
one of the most clearly described in the Committee's note is the
23(b)(2) action for injunctive relief in cases of racial discrimination.
As Committee member John Frank has put it in his historical overview of the Rule, "If there was a single, undoubted goal of the [Advisory Committee on Civil Rules], the energizing force which
motivated the whole rule, it was the firm determination to create a
class action system which could deal with civil rights and, explicitly,
segregation. "8
The available evidence strongly suggests that the dominant purpose of the 1966 amendment was to "enable" litigation both by creating an effective enforcement mechanism under 23(b)(2),
primarily for civil rights cases, and by facilitating the prosecution of
small claims susceptible of group adjudication but otherwise uneconomical to litigate, such as consumer and environmental claims.
Professor Kaplan indicated that the two aims of the class-action device were to reduce duplicative actions and "to provide means of
vindicating the rights of grol;lpS of people who individually would be
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at
all."9 Professor Charles Joiner, another member of the Committee,
spoke approvingly of Rule 23 as providing "additional safeguards to
the unrepresented. " 10 As the Supreme Court later explained in
Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper:
The aggregation of individual claims in the context of a classwide
suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unreme6. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. lNDus. & CoM. L. REv. 497, 497 {1969).
7. Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1991,
at 5, 13 n.32.
8. John P. Frank, Thirty Years of Class Actions in Historical Prospective 3 (Apr. 28, 1994)
(unpublished paper, on file with the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, United States Judicial Conference).
9. Kaplan, supra note 6, at 497. According to fonner Judge Marvin Frankel, Kaplan emphasized the class action's "historic mission of taking care of the smaller guy." Marvin E.
Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 {1966).
10. Charles Joiner, The New Civil Rules, 40 F.R.D. 359, 367 {1966); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (describing Rule 23's ability to facilitate effective representation for absent plaintiffs).
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died by the regulatory action of government. Where it is not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a
multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons
may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device.11

One purpose the drafters did not have, however, was to create a
device for the aggregation of multiparty litigation. That type of litigation still lay largely in the future. 12 Even mass-tort cases - or
"mass-accident" cases as they were known then13 - such as
airplane-crash and hotel-fire cases, were thought to be beyond the
Rule. As the Advisory Committee's note put it, "[a] 'mass accident' resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood that significant
questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses to liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways."1 4
Far from wanting to facilitate aggregation, the members of the
Committee were concerned lest defendants use the Rule to create a
collusive class and, by settling, largely escape liability. 15
Nevertheless, with the passage of time, the Rule acquired a new
gloss. Lawyers and judges, many of the latter initially quite hostile
to class actions,16 began to look to Rule 23 to meet a felt need for
an aggregation device as mass litigation proliferated. Judge Joseph
Weis observed in 1986 that "[a]lthough that [Advisory Committee]
11. Deposit Guar. Natl. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). In a footnote, the
Court added:
A significant benefit to claimants who choose to litigate their individual claims in a
class-action context is the prospect of reducing their costs of litigation, particularly attorney's fees, by allocating such costs among all members of the class who benefit from any
recovery. Typically, the attorney's fees of a named plaintiff proceeding without reliance
on Rule 23 could exceed the value of the individual judgment in favor of any one
plaintiff.
445 U.S. at 338 n.9.
12. Although the electrical-equipment antitrust litigation involving numerous substantial
individual claims against equipment manufacturers was then underway, there is no indication
that class-action treatment was considered as a means for aggregation of those cases. That
litigation, instead, provided the impetus for the multidistrict coordination statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1968).
13. See Resnik, supra note 7, at 9.
14. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103. Professor Kaplan explained that the point was not
that after determination of common questions the individual claimants might have to
come in and prove their damages, [but rather] that in accident cases the realities of
litigation will often suggest that the class action device is not "superior" to more commonplace devices; in some of these cases, moreover, individual questions of liability and
defense will overwhelm the common questions.
Kapl?Jl. supra note 3, at 393 (footnote omitted).
15. See Frank, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4-5).
16. See, e.g., Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 236-39 (9th Cir. 1974)
(Duniway, C.J., concurring), cen. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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statement continues to be repeated in case law, there is growing
acceptance of the notion that some mass accident situations may be
good candidates for class action treatment."17 Use of Rule 23 to
aggregate claims that could be litigated economically on an individual basis and where estoppel was less significant than in civil rights
and small-claims actions, such as claims arising out of mass torts,
however, was remote from the drafters' purpose to enable and facilitate litigation. It also posed the very danger of collusive actions
and settlements the drafters feared. Still, the inexorable pressures
of mass-tort litigation on courts and parties have legitimated to
some degree the application of the class-action device.
An additional purpose of class actions, probably implicit in what
the revisers said and did, was to promote efficiency and economy.
The class action became a case-management device for minimizing
duplicative activity in the adjudication of related claims, for example, in institutional-reform or discrimination cases, involving claims
more limited in scope and potential impact than mass-tort litigation.1s As such, it also serves as an effective vehicle for publicinterest litigation, furthering the enforcement of statutory policies
heavily dependent on private initiative.19
While this enumeration of purposes is not necessarily exhaustive,20 it suffices to make the point. Rule 23 is being used to serve a
range of different purposes, and, as discussed below, different pro17. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1008 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom.
Celotex Corp. v. School Dist., 479 U.S. 852, cert. denied sub nom. National Gypsum Co. v.
School Dist., 479 U.S. 915 (1986); see also Central Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace & Co., 6
F.3d 177, 181-82 {4th Cir.1993) (arguing for liberal application of Rule 23 to mass-tort cases);
In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 725-38 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989); Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of
Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 461, 462-83 (1988) (reviewing instances of applications of Rule 23 to mass-tort
litigation).
18. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 701 {1979) (approving class action for
attack on the recoupment procedures used by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare and commenting that "the class-action device saves the resources of both the courts
and the parties by permitting an issue ... to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule
23").
19. See Frank, supra note 8 (manuscript at 3); see also Six Mexican Workers v. Arizona
Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1990) (enforcing the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act).
20. The purposes of the Rule have been summarized as
the efficient resolution of the claims or liabilities of many individuals in a single action,
the elimination of repetitious litigation and possibly inconsistent adjudications involving
common questions, related events, or requests for similar relief, and the establishment of
an effective procedure for those whose economic position is such that it is unrealistic to
expect them to seek to vindicate their rights in separate lawsuits.
7A CHAru..Es A. WRIGHT ET. AL., FEDERAL PRAcnCE AND PROCEDURE § 1754, at 49 (2d ed.
1986). An additional purpose, according to one court, was to function as a "deterrent for
those who engage in complicated and imaginative rather than straightforward schemes to
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cedures are necessary and appropriate to serve those purposes.
This leads to confusion and even conflict in the application and administration of the existing Rule. If the Rule were revised to serve
one purpose well, say, to facilitate aggregation in mass-tort cases, it
could not be expected to serve as well when invoked for a different
purpose, say, consumer-claim litigation.
One problem with much of the current scholarly comment and
critique of the Rule is that it ignores this reality. Authors tend to
focus on the application of the Rule to meet their particular needs
or interests, disregarding the impact of their proposals on the
Rule's ability to accomplish other purposes.21 They tend to disregard the generic character of the Rule in its present form and the
multiplicity of interests and needs it must be made to serve. Most
importantly, they ignore the risk that accommodating particular interests will likely diminish the utility of the Rule to serve other
interests.
II.

CONFLICTING PURPOSES

It is not necessarily objectionable for a rule of procedure to
serve a number of different purposes. But the unique character of
class-action litigation, in which named parties represent the interests of members of a judicially authorized class, creates a potential
for conflicts among those interests that needs to be accommodated.
Depending upon the nature of the class and its claims, this accommodation may need to be done in a variety of ways. Thus expectations of the class-action device will vary with the nature of the
particular litigation in which it is employed.
As noted, the original purpose of the 1966 Rule primarily was to
enable litigation of numerous related small claims, such as those
commonly found in consumer, securities, and antitrust actions.22
The salient characteristics of these kinds of class actions are:
(1) Individual claims are generally too small to permit plaintiffs to
prosecute them individually.
inflate stock prices." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 816 (1976).
21. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 CowM. L. REv. 1343 (1995); Nancy Morawetz, Underinclusive Class Actions (Mar. 31,
1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with
the New York University School of Law); Alan B. Morrison & Brian Wolfman, Representing
the Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief (Mar. 23, 1995) (unpublished
paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on file with the New York University School of Law).
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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(2) Common questions predominate strongly over any individual issues permitting adjudication of liability and damages in a single-class
trial even if a mechanism for allocation of the proceeds from a judgment must be devised.
(3) Opt-out rights and protection against claim preclusion are therefore relatively unimportant as are elaborate notice provisions that
would ensure that every potential class member is notified; indeed,
because their cost may be an obstacle to maintaining such an action,
they may be counterproductive and frustrate the enabling purpose of
class treatment.23

These kinds of class actions, on the other hand, present a greater
need for control against overenforcement because costs, especially
attorneys fees, may become disproportionate to the amounts at
stake and the benefits to individual class members. Since individual
plaintiffs have little to gain from the action, there is also a risk that
lawyers, rather than clients (who may only be nominal clients), will
control the litigation with the ethical problems that can follow. 24
These problems are of particular concern in the context of settlement when the benefits to lawyers may appear wholly out of proportion to those received by individual class members. On the
other hand, judicial oversight of the settlement may be less urgent
here; because the exposure is generally less threatening to the defendant than in mass-tort litigation and because the predominance
of common over individual issues makes a class-action trial feasible,
trial is a realistic alternative to settlement for the parties.
Application of Rule 23 for the purpose of claim aggregation occurs in an entirely different context, usually in multiparty litigation
involving substantial claims, frequently but not always mass-tort
claims. The salient characteristics of such class actions are:
(1) Claims are large enough to permit individual plaintiffs to prosecute them separately; moreover, significant issues often may affect individual plaintiffs in different ways.
(2) Because individual autonomy is a significant interest, protection
against preclusion and of the choice to litigate individually is important; effective notice procedures and opt-out rights are therefore
critical.
(3) Because the size, number, and complexity of claims will strain the
resources of the parties and the court, duplicative activity - discovery, motions, and rulings on common issues - needs to be reduced
by class treatment of common questions. At the same time, courts
must avoid precipitous and premature resolution of issues that would
23. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161-69, 173-76 (1974).
24. Cf. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
469, 502-05 (1994). Such considerations contributed to the recent adoption of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737.
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dispose of the entire litigation. Pretrial procedures need to allow for
the development of a record adequate both to assess the bases for
claims and defenses and to resolve the complexities presented by this
kind of litigation, whether they be questions of scientific evidence or
choice-of-law or jurisdiction issues.25

The precise impact of these features on the use of Rule 23 will
vary with the particular nature of the litigation. Mass-tort actions
range across a wide spectrum, differing in their manageability and
susceptibility to class-action treatment. On one end are those arising out of a single event, where the class is clearly defined, its members (more or less) identifiable, and common issues predominate.
Next are actions based on the use of a defective product, where the
nature of the harm is readily ascertainable, but the separate events
and the membership of the class are not. Manageability here will
turn on the number and ascertainability of claimants and the degree
of information about the characteristics and effects of the product.
The most problematic type of class action involves toxic-tort claims,
where uncertainty surrounds both the fact and effect of exposure;
the manifestation of injury may be long delayed, and the potential
appearance of future claimants makes it impossible to ascertain the
membership of the class.2 6
In applying Rule 23 to multiclaim litigation such as mass-tort
actions, the critical question is whether common issues predominate
sufficiently to support class treatment. Because proof of individual
injury is an essential element, class-wide adjudication may be problematic, and class actions may be more suitable as vehicles for settlement than for adjudication. As a result, in applying Rule 23 to
mass-tort litigation, the principal concern has been over settlement
classes and the issues they raise: the adequacy of representation of
the various interests on the plaintiffs' side, the protection of the defendants' interests and those of the public, and the standards and
procedures for court approval of settlements.21
Finally, class actions play a role in litigation that can benefit
from the economies and efficiencies class treatment offers, even if
25. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 184 (1995); In re Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995).
26. See generally Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73 TEXAS
L. REV. 1821 (1995).
27. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that certification of the settlement class requires compliance
with all provisions of Rule 23); see also William W Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class
Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 837 (1995) (suggesting a possible revision
of Rule 23(e) to spell out factors relevant to whether a class-action settlement should be
approved).
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neither the enabling nor the claim aggregation rationale apply. In
some types of litigation, such as institutional-reform or discrimination cases, common questions may predominate enough to permit
quicker and more economical adjudication by means of a class action, especially when the only relief sought is injunctive. Opt-out
rights and protection against claim preclusion are relatively unimportant here, while res judicata and consistency of outcomes are
desired objectives. Public policy favoring private enforcement of
regulatory schemes may reenforce the rationale for the use of class
actions in such cases and also in others, including securities, antitrust, environmental, and statutory-benefits litigation.
III.

REVISING RULE

23

This brief overview suggests that for optimum results, a classaction rule should function differently depending on the purpose
for which it is invoked. A rule that works well as an enabling device would not necessarily work well as an aggregation device, and
one designed for aggregation would not necessarily further efficient
litigation management. That is not to say that an effective classaction rule cannot be transsubstantive. But the preceding discussion suggests that in light of the different characteristics of class actions, essential components of a class-action regime may differ,
without regard to the underlying substantive law.2s
· It seems fair to ask, therefore, whether a single, generic classaction rule can be expected to serve such diverse purposes well. A
class-action rule is not simply a rule of the road; it is a means for
allocating power and responsibility among the participants in the
litigation - imposing a system of checks and balances. Thus, a
named plaintiff has the power to litigate the claim as the representative of the class members and the responsibility to act as a fiduciary for the class. The class members, in turn, have some power to
frustrate the representative litigation, at least to exit from it. Attorneys have the power to act for a large group of unseen clients, with
little or no consultation, but bear commensurate responsibility to
represent them fairly and adequately. The court has extensive
power to structure and manage the litigation and also large responsibilities in looking after the interests of absent, albeit represented,
parties. For best results; the way in which powers and responsibilities are allocated and checks and balances imposed perhaps ought
28. I do not mean to suggest that bright lines create distinct categories of class actions,
but, in most instances, the characteristics of the litigation will be sufficiently clear to point
toward the appropriate treatment.
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to differ depending on the nature of the class action. The more
specifically the Rule is written to address an intended purpose, the
better it will serve that purpose - not only because of the explicit
direction it will provide the participants in the process, but also because the drafters, to write specifically, will have had to think in
specifics rather than in generalities. At the same time, however, the
more specifically the Rule is designed for one purpose, the less utility it will have for others.
At least three approaches to the revision _of Rule 23 have been
discussed, to which a fourth more modest alternative is added
here:29
1) A set of different, substance-based rules for different kinds of class
actions.
2) A single rule specifying different procedures for different kinds of
actions.
3) A single, management rule for the structuring of multiclaim
litigation.
4) An elaboration of the Advisory Committee's note to provide more
specific guidance for the appropriate application of the existing Rule
23.

The first approach would entail the adoption of different rules
for different categories of actions. Rules specifically tailored for
use in particular kinds of actions would increase the rules' utility
and efficiency. But the downside of a multiplicity of class-action
rules is the potential for satellite litigation over the selection of the
applicable rule; the different kinds of class actions will never be so
clearly distinguishable as to preclude all controversy, and some actions will fall into gray areas between the rules.
The second approach would be to adopt a single rule specifying
procedures for different categories of actions, taking into account
their distinct features. Putting aside the existing 23(b)(1) and (b )(2)
categories of mandatory class actions, one could envision creating
perhaps three categories for (b)(3) actions corresponding to the
three purposes of class actions discussed here. The Rule then
would require the judge first to determine the applicable category
by applying the specified criteria and standards prescribed for use
in connection with the particular category and then to make findings supporting the determination.3o The Rule would offer gui29. See, e.g., Nielson, supra note 17, at 483-97. Much of the motivation for the suggestions was to make the Rule more user friendly for mass-tort litigation.
30. One commentator, pointing out that certification could have a number of different
goals, such as creating "the most 'manageable' litigating unit, the most efficient process for
resolving multiple cases, the maximally fair and just set of outcomes consistent with resource
constraints, or some combination of these," has called for a rule that would "articulate princi-
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dance for establishing procedures, such as those for notice and opt
out, appropriate for each category.
A third approach essentially would create a management rule
for multiclaim litigation as a companion to the present Rule 16.
Such a rule would call for the judge to establish an appropriate
structure for the litigation as part of a case-management order in
multiclaim litigation. In doing so, the court and the parties would
consider and select from among a range of available alternatives.
These would include use of representative parties (as under present
Rule 23), lead cases (to provide information about outcomes suitable to create formulae or grids for the resolution of related claims),
various forms of consolidation (as under present Rule 42(a)), intervention or joinder, some form of coordination, or other innovative
alternatives.31 The Rule could provide guidance for the selection
from among alternatives, identifying their purposes and the factors
to be considered in making the selection. It could identify appropriate safeguards, protecting relevant interests, to be included in a
case-management order establishing a particular structure. It could
specify the requisite :findings to support selection of a structure.
The Rule thus would enable a judge, with the assistance of the parties, to fashion a structure-and-management program best suited
for the circumstances of the litigation. Its aim would be to use the
existing rules to make an integrated system for the fair and efficient
resolution of multiclaim litigation.
Finally, a more modest approach might be to revise only the
Advisory Committee's note for Rule 23. The note could explicate
the different purposes the Rule could serve and the ways in which
class-action procedures could be adapted to serve best the particular litigation, as discussed above. The note could assist courts and
counsel by identifying relevant factors for consideration in making
discretionary decisions. It could, for example, spell out factors for
consideration in the determination of whether to approve classaction settlements.32 It could provide guidance for the application
of the notice requirement. It might clarify the respective obligations of counsel in the different roles in which they act in class
actions.
pies of general application that will guide trial judge discretion and support meaningful appellate review of class determinations, but that will also leave room for adapting class actions
to the circumstances of specific cases." Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the
Federal Class Action, 14 REv. Lmo. 79, 97, 107 (1994).
31. See generally Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70
CoRNELL L. REv. 779 (1985}.
32. See supra note 27.
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Under any of these approaches, the judge of necessity would
retain broad discretion, perhaps even broader than now. A rule
intended to further litigation management is most useful when it is
founded on the court's inherent power to manage the litigation
before it and contemplates the liberal exercise of that power. But a
rule under which the court exercises that power to structure multiple claims and design a process for their resolution will tend to have
a greater impact than rules that are purely procedural "rules of the
road," not only because of the cumulative effect of multiclaim litigation but also because of the way in which it will affect the resolution of claims and defenses.33 The consequent dilemma is that as
the need for judicial discretion - and for creativity and innovation
- increases with the complexities and demands of multiclaim litigation, the risk of harm from its unguided exercise increases as well.
Rulemaking must confront this dilemma, which is perhaps
greatest in the class-action area, regardless of what shape the classaction rule eventually takes. Rule 23's shortcoming in this respect
is illustrated by recent decisions in which one court certified a 100million-member class of nicotine-dependent smokers while another
court vacated a certification of a much smaller and more clearly
defined class of HIV-infected hemophiliacs as a usurpation of
power.34 A rule of such ambiguity and lack of predictability may
well increase rather than lighten the burdens of complex litigation.
To work well, the rule not only must be suited for its intended purpose but also must be capable of being soundly and efficiently administered. The trial judge's discretion needs to be complemented
by guidance defining the bounds within which his orders may operate; those bounds must be reasonably clear yet also flexible enough
to permit the court to deal effectively with the litigation. At the
same time, appellate oversight of the trial judge's exercise of discretion must be appropriately provided for. Just as the exercise of
trial-court discretion needs to be guided by discemable standards,
so appellate review needs objective reference points based on compliance with those standards. Unless rulemaking in this sensitive
area is informed by these considerations, confusion will reign and
additional cost and delay will be generated.

33. See In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368, 374 (2d Cir. 1993); Malcolm v.
National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350·52 (2d Cir. 1993) (granting consolidation under
Rule 42(a)).
34. Compare Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995) with In
re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 184 (1995).
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Revision of Rule 23 offers opportunities as well as challenges. It
could result in opening Pandora's box, leading to new uncertainties,
unintended consequences, and expanded litigation. Attempts to
adapt the Rule to current circumstances can launch an unending
process of change as those circumstances keep changing. Yet the
process of considering possible revisions can be productive, generating better understanding and useful analysis. So the idea ought
not to be rejected out of hand without discussion.
IV.

IMPROVING PRACTICE UNDER RULE

23

One way such discussion could be useful is if it leads to an examination of the practice under present Rule 23 and consideration
of ways in which it might be improved. 1\vo approaches to improvement suggest themselves: first, avoiding reliance on generalities in the application of the Rule and second, more creative use of
the superiority analysis under Rule 23(b)(3).
A. Avoiding Reliance on Generalities in the Application of the
Rule

Class-action jurisprudence is guided - and burdened - by
generalities. Generalities, derived from the text of the Rule and
court decisions, tend to control such matters as the timing of certification motions, the treatment of motions to dismiss, the availability
of discovery, the nature and timing of notice, and the approval of
class-action settlements.35 But class actions are not fungible and
the pretense that they are impairs the utility of Rule 23 and can
impose unnecessary burdens on the litigation. Although to a limited extent, the Rule requires the court making a class determination to consider the differences among class actions, such as the
interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of the actions,36 the general principles governing the
conduct of class actions are not sensitive to those differences. That
is not to say that courts apply these principles inflexibly. But they
tend at least to pay lip service to them and often permit them to
stand in the way of more incisive analysis leading to more effective
use of the Rule. One way in which practice under Rule 23 could be
35. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ("We find nothing in
either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as
a class action."); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 678 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring identification of
class members before giving of class notice), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)·(D).

March 1996]

Rule 23

1263

improved is by frankly acknowledging the differences in the purposes served by different categories of class actions whenever they
are relevant to procedure under the Rule and adapting that procedure to serve best the purpose of class-action treatment in the particular litigation. Here are some illustrations:
{1) Tuning of certification motions: Rule 23{c)(1) directs the court to
make the class-action determination "as soon as practicable." Courts
often read this as requiring that it be made at an early date. Courts
ought to consider a less wooden approach, taking into consideration
relevant factors that should control timing, such as whether deferring
certification would prejudice putative class members, whether it could
lead to substantial duplicative activity and unnecessary expense,
whether it could interfere \vith consideration of preferable and less
costly alternatives to a class action, and whether instead it would permit further development of the record leading to a more informed
decision.37 The impact of such factors will vary depending on the
kind of class action.
(2) Conduct of discovery: The general principle that discovery normally should not be directed at class members, particularly before
certification, does not apply with equal force to all class actions.
While it has merit in small-claims actions, it may be inappropriate in
mass-tort litigation or when the typicality of claims may be in question, as in discrimination cases. Thus, in some cases, before the court
can decide whether common issues predominate, it may need extensive information obtainable only through discovery of plaintiffs.
(3) Precertification consideration of the merits: The related principle
that the court should not assess the merits of the action before acting
on certification similarly ought to be regarded as fiexible. 38 One of
the emerging realities of class-action practice is that it focuses largely
on the pretrial phase, with little attention to trial and adjudication. It
is doubtful whether most parties to class actions, especially in masstort cases, seriously contemplate a trial, viewing the Rule mainly as a
vehicle for settlement.39 As a result, practice under the Rule can become distorted and lead to abuse of the Rule. Superiority analysis
under Rule 23{b)(3) would be more focused and class-action practice
more orderly if courts, in making decisions on certification and procedure, took into account the merits of the action when doing so would
be helpful and appropriate.
37. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974) (postponing class certification until trial of lead plaintiff's individual claim); Perez v.
Government of Virgin Islands, 109 F.R.D. 384 (D.V.I. 1986) (same).
38. Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. But see Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co., 573 F.2d 309 (5th
Cir. 1978) (holding that certification ruling premature when necessary discovery had been
precluded).
39. Few mass-tort class actions have gone to trial as class actions. Cf. In re RhonePoulenc Rorer, Inc., 51F.3d1293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.184 (1995) (contemplating
a trial of common issues eventuating in special verdicts, not final judgments, that might then
be used in later filed actions in various state or federal courts).
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(4) Precertification motion practice: Closely related is the reluctance
of many courts to entertain dispositive motions before certification.
While care must be taken to protect the rights of putative class members, early motions can assist in the efficient handling of class actions
and should not be ruled out.
(5) Notice and opt out: As previously discussed, the importance of
notice and opt-out rights differs depending on the nature of the class
action. Courts should look at the circumstances of each case in fashioning an appropriate procedure.
(6) Considering alternatives to a class action: Though the Rule requires that the court, before certifying a 23(b)(3) action, find that "a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy," courts rarely if ever give
much consideration at the certification stage to how class-action treatment compares with other structuring alternatives available under the
Federal Rules. Reference to superiority necessarily calls for an answer to the question: Superior to what? As discussed below, courts
should look, not only at the alternative of denying class certification,
but also at the range of alternatives available for structuring multiclaim litigation.

B.

Creative Use of the Superiority Analysis Under Rule 23 (b) (3)

Taking seriously the requirement of a finding that class-action
treatment would be "superior" to other available methods of adjudication may improve the administration of the Rule. As the court
said in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., "The superiority finding requires at a minimum ... an informed consideration of alternative
available methods of adjudication of each issue."4 0 These alternatives "are hardly confined to the class action, on the one side, and
individual uncoordinated lawsuits, on the other."41 The earlier discussion of a litigation-management rule as an alternative to the
present Rule noted the various structuring alternatives available
under the Federal Rules. Greater attention to the "superiority"
analysis under the existing Rule might help turn Rule 23 into a "virtual" management rule, encouraging consideration by the judge of

40. Katz, 496 F.2d at 757.
41. Kaplan, supra note 3, at 390-91 (citing Judge Jack Weinstein's discussion in Revision
of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 438-54 (1960)).
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alternatives to class actions for the optimum structuring of the particular litigation.42 Here are alternatives a court might consider:
(1) Consolidation of claims and selection of lead or test cases for trial
under Rule 42(a).43
·(2) Severing common issues for trial under Rule 42(b).44
(3) In mass-tort litigation, limiting classes to a single state (to avoid
choice-of-law and due-process problems) and excluding plaintiffs in
actions pending in state courts (to avoid interference with those
actions).
(4) In small-claims class actions, calibrating the notice requirement
and providing a procedure for opt ins or one-way intervention, either
postjudgment or postsettlement.
(5) Permitting intervention, for example, by a governmentenforcement agency, in an individual plaintiff's case (avoiding the
need for class treatment).45
(6) Limiting the remedy to injunctive relief rendering class action
superfluous. 46

These are examples. They reveal no stunning innovations; to
the contrary, they may represent a return to basics, reflecting the
intellectual underpinnings of the current Rule. They may help remind courts faced with a motion to certify a class that they are not
limited to an up-or-down response nor are they bound by the format counsel has presented or by perceived rigid rules governing the
class-action regime. Whether the purpose is facilitation, aggregation, or efficiency and economy, the Federal Rules, taken as a
whole, offer opportunities for sound and creative management.
42. The Advisory Committee's note recommends that "the court with the aid of the parties ought to assess the relative advantages of alternative procedures for handling the total
controversy." Advisory Committee Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103.
43. Test cases were found to be superior in Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (involving a truth-in-lending claim where a defendant
was bound by one-way estoppel); Perez v. Government of Virgin Islands, 109 F.R.D. 384
(D.V.I. 1986) (involving insureds of defunct insurance company who sued government for
negligent supervision); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51 F.3d at 1293; Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (using statistical sampling to determine awards
in cases); Advisory Committee Note, supra note 2, 39 F.R.D. at 103; Michael J. Saks & Peter
David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in
the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REv. 815 (1992).
44. See Maenner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 127 F.R.D. 488, 490-92 (W.D. Mich.
1989) (severing liability issues for separate trial before adjudication of class members' individual damage claims); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 98 F.R.D. 254, 268-69 (D.
Del. 1983) (severing dispute over interpretation of decree for trial before adjudication of
class members' individual claims).
45. See Stuart v. Hewlett Packard Co., 66 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (finding intervention by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to avoid manageability problems of
class action).
46. See Ferguson v. Housing Auth., 499 F. Supp. 334 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (involving an action
by public-housing tenants challenging eviction policy of a housing authority).
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CONCLUSION

Where then should we go from here? One is reminded of a saying: If you don't know where you are going, all roads lead there.
Rule 23 is not perfect, but it makes little sense to revise it unless
one first identifies the defects that need fixing and determines how
to fix them without creating new ones. Trying to make the Rule
work better for one purpose may impair it for others.
That is not to say that a close study of the Rule is not in order.
Such a study might well begin with a searching examination of how
the Rule is now being used. The results of such an examination
might lead to the conclusion that the need for revision is not pressing. It might show, for example, that recent decisions provide adequate guidance for the appropriate administration of class-action
settlements.
Perhaps the most serious problem with the present Rule is its
lack of predictability. How the Rule is applied from case to case
seems largely to be a matter of the length of the chancellor's foot.
Indeed, some see Rule 23 as a rule of equity. It is inevitable that
the management of multiclaim litigation calls for a large measure of
judicial discretion; it surely invokes the judge's experience, judgment, and, one hopes, common sense. But a lack of unifying principles in the administration of the Rule undermines its effectiveness
and public confidence in the system. While these issues ought to be
faced frankly, there is no obvious answer. It would certainly help,
however, if judges supported their rulings with clearly articulated
reasons.
In the end, what is done about Rule 23 should be informed by
the overall objective of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "[T]o
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. "47 If the rising cost of resolving individual claims in federal
courts and the pressures of mass litigation are not to frustrate this
worthy objective, wise use should be made of the available range of
litigation structures, of which class actions are only one. Adapting
such structures and making them work requires resolution of the
tensions between the interest in individual justice and the interest in
efficiency. While individual justice ought not to be sacrificed to efficiency, without efficiency individual justice may be lost.4B
R. CIV. P. 1.

47.

FED.

48.

See generally

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MAss TORT LmGATION

(1995); Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Representation and Fees
(Apr. 6, 1995) (unpublished paper prepared for Research Conference on Class Actions, on
file with the New York University School of Law).

